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This paper studies how the possibility for firms to sign collusive agreements (as for 
instance being part of alliances, cartels and mergers) may affect their quality and price 
choice in a market with vertically differentiated goods. For this purpose we model the 
firm decisions as a three-stage game in which, at the first stage, firms can form an 
alliance via a sequential game of coalition formation and, at the second and third stage, 
they decide simultaneously their product qualities and prices, respectively. In such a 
setting we study whether there exist circumstances under which either full or partial 
collusion can be sustained as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the coalition 
formation game. Also, we analyse the effects of different coalition structures on 
equilibrium qualities, prices and profits accruing to firms. It is shown that only 
intermediate coalition structures arise at the equilibrium, with the bottom quality firm 
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coincide with that observed in the duopoly case, with only two quality variants on sale. 
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1 Introduction
This paper studies how the possibility for rms to sign collusive agreements (as for instance
being part of alliances, cartels and mergers) may a¤ect their quality and price choice in a
market with vertically di¤erentiated goods. It is worth mentioning that, although collusive
agreements among rms are rarely persecuted by courts on quality grounds, the issue of goods
quality frequently arises in anti-trust trials.1 One case of quality restriction related to rms
collusive agreements is, for instance, reported by Yanich (2010, 2011, 2013) who analyses in
detail the Shared Service Agreements (SSA) signed by some TV channels in US, as CBS,
NBC, FOX, CW, with the aim to limit their duplicative broadcasting costs and coordinating
their journalistscrew and editorial sta¤. Yanich (2011) reports how a major e¤ect of these
agreements is a drastic reduction of broadcast news varieties. The data gathered from a sample
of 17 channels also shows that, in general, ownership concentration may signicantly explain
the average diversity of broadcast news, with consolidated stations producing less local content
than independent channels.2
Somehow opposite results were obtained studying a sample of US radio stations. Berry and
Waldfogel (2001) found evidence that the mergers followed to the 1996 Telecommunications Act
drastically reduced the number of stations without, however, reducing their apparent product
variety and, actually, slightly increasing it. Similar evidence is reported by Sweeting (2010)
for the radio music industry and by George (2007) for the US newspapers.3
However, sparse evidence suggests that, in many cases, the entry of new competitors in the
market pushes the incumbent to reduce his product variants. Johnson and Myatt (2003) detail
a few cases in which the incumbent adjusts its product line in response to a new entrant, in
particular withdrawing some of the products from the market (pruning its product lines).4
1This is likely to depend on the di¢ culty for the court to ascertain whether quality re-shu­ ing ultimately
depends on rmscollusion. See, for instance, McMillan (2015, pp.1921-1922) who analyses all recent US antitrust
trials in which quality issues arise. As a matter of fact, US Antitrust Law prohibits "all unreasonable restraints
on trade, regardless of whether they are based on price, quantity or quality".
2The channels participating to SSAs are often reported to simulcast identical content. Such content is,
however, judged of higher quality by the public than before the agreements (using average advertising prices as
quality indicators). See Yanich (2010).
3Using data on the assignment of reporters to topical areas at 706 newspapers in the US, George (2007)
observes that di¤erentiation increases with ownership concentration. Sweeting (2010) nds instead that those
rms that buy competing stations tend to emphasize "service di¤erentiation" among themselves as well as from
the competing stations.
4For instance Timex recently removed a few of its lower-priced watches from the Indian wristwatch market
and Mitsubishi phased-out the low-end versions of its Trium mobile phones Many more cases of incumbent rms
"pruning" their product lines are reported in Johnson and Myatt (2003).
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A new entrant in the market can either lead to the incumbents exit from lower markets or,
alternatively, force him to introduce a low quality ghting brand,5 which allows the rm to be
competitive in lower markets, still preserving margins on the high quality good.6
In some other cases, merging rms have been observed to re-shape their products quality in
more sophisticated ways. Giraud-Heraud et al. (2003) describes the case of European mineral
water market consolidation process occurring in the 90s, and driving its main actors (Nestlé
and Danone) to reshu­ e their brands so as to form portfolios of directly substitutable products.
Whatever the strategies adopted by the rms, the formation of alliances between rms
appears as strictly interlinked with the choice of their product quality. In order to study the
nature of this link, in this paper we introduce a model of endogenous alliance formation in
which rms can endogenously select the quality and price of their products. As in some of
the cases mentioned above, in our model colluding rms may possess an incentive to reduce
the variants on sale, to soften the existing price competition among rms in the alliance, as
well as that with those competing outside. We also nd that in some cases an alliance of rms
playing against an independent rm can nd protable to adopt a leapfrogging strategy, so
as to enhance the vertical di¤erentiation within the alliance and in the market as a whole.
In particular, using a three-rm model, we are able to characterize all equilibrium alliance
structures arising in a vertically di¤erentiated market. In particular, we show that when the
process of alliance formation is sequential (as in a bargaing model à la Rubinstein, 1982), the
temptation of every rm to free-ride and to remain independent can lead the rms to form in
equilibrium only intermediate coalition structures, with only two qualities remaining on sale,
whereas the whole industry alliance turns out to be unstable.
1.1 Related Literature
The relationship between collusive agreements and vertical product di¤erentiation was formerly
analysed by Hackner (1994). In his work, the key question is whether price collusion is more
likely to arise when products are close substitutes or, rather, when they are highly di¤eren-
tiated. In a natural duopoly setting, he nds that monopoly pricing is easier to sustain in
markets in which products are similar. Further, he proves that the incentive to deviate from a
5For a duopoly with quantity competition Johnson and Myatt (2003) show that these two cases can be, in
turn, due to the decreasing marginal revenues or nonmonotone marginal revenue of the rms.
6After Hewlett-Packards entry into the market, IBM introduced its LaserJet IIP, a lower-quality substitute
for IBM LaserPrinter. Similarly, after the entry of low-cost airlines British Airways initially concentrated its
e¤orts on the high-segment of the market, deciding afterward to establish Go, its low-cost airline supposed to
compete with Easyjet and Ryanair in the economy ight market.
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collusive agreement is always stronger for the high-quality rm. The main reason is that when
the quality gap between products is signicant, the prot of the top-quality rm is already
high under no collusion, so that its incentive to collude is weak. As the quality gap decreases
and the noncooperative payo¤ become smaller for the high-quality rm, reaching a collusive
agreement gets more and more attractive. Along the same research line, Ecchia and Lamber-
tini (1997) study how the stability of price collusion in a duopoly setting is a¤ected by the
introduction of a minimum quality standard. They observe how the introduction of a welfare-
maximizing minimum quality standard makes collusive agreements more di¢ cult to sustain.
This is because the existence of a standard decreases product di¤erentiation by providing the
bottom quality rm with a stronger incentive to break the agreement.7
There are two common traits in these works. First, (i) the degree of product di¤erentiation
does not change after a coalition has formed, since the collusive behavior is restricted to
pricing. The former assumption is a natural entry point in the literature on cartel stability
under product di¤erentiation, as it enables to disentangle the e¤ect of quality gap on the
stability of a cartel. Further, conceiving collusion in terms of pricing is particularly reasonable
in a short-run perspective. Still, it leaves unexplored a companion question, namely the e¤ect
of the cartel on product di¤erentiation. This analysis is particularly pregnant in a long-run
perspective since one cannot exclude that in a more extended time span a coalition (typically
a cartel or a merger) entails structural changes, such as relocations of production facilities, or
adjustment in the product range and quality.
Secondly, (ii) the market is populated by two rms so that it turns out to be fully monop-
olized by a grand coalition in the case of cooperation between rms.8 While considering at
the start a duopoly enables to detail the e¤ects of a full cooperation, casual observations show
that, there exist circumstances under which rms choose to form an intermediate alliance (i.e.
one including a subset of rms in the market) rather than the grand coalition. While in an
intermediate alliance, colluding rms compete against some rivals outside the coalition so that
a noncooperative behavior is still preserved. Of course, a priori the e¤ects of a partial alliance
are not equivalent to those observed when all agents collude and mimic a monopolist.
To the best of our knowledge, the possibility that rms cooperate both along a price
dimension and a quality dimension in a vertically di¤erentiated market has been investigated
only by Lambertini (2000). He studies how the cartel stability is related to R&D activity in a
7 In Hackner, the opposite holds since, due to the cost structure, in his model the asymmetry in prots gives
an advantage to the high quality rm.
8The grand coalition is the one formed by all rms in the market.
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duopoly with convex costs, and assumes that the collusive quality choice can occur either under
price or quantity-setting behaviour.9 The issue concerned with the alliance formation when
more than two rms are active in a vertically di¤erentiated market is however still unexplored,
like so the impact of partial collusion on the market equilibrium. The introduction of an
intermediate quality rm sheds light on some interesting features of the coalition formation
process. As far as we know, the only model of vertical di¤erentiation with three independent
rms competing in quality and price is provided by Scarpa (1998).10 Considering the role of a
minimum quality standard, Scarpa (1998) stresses that the demand level of a rm in a vertically
di¤erentiated market depends on quality and price of adjacent rms in the product space. This
property, reminiscent of a spatial competition approach, is rather interesting when considering
the rationale adopted by the colluding rms to dene the optimal range of variants. Indeed,
since only adjacent variants compete against each other, under partial collusion dening the
optimal set of products to market requires to put in balance the cannibalization e¤ect that a
variant produced by the coalition may exert within the coalition with the possibility that this
variant steals consumers from the rival rm (henceforth stealing e¤ect).11
1.2 Our Paper
In the present paper we remove both assumptions that collusion only develops along a price
dimension and that the market is a duopoly. To this aim, we consider a vertically di¤erentiated
setting in which three rms produce di¤erent variants of the same product.
More specically, we introduce a three-stage game where, at the rst stage, every rm
expresses its willingness to form an alliance or, alternatively, to play as singleton. An alliance
can either contains all rms in the market (grand coalition) or only a subset of them (two rms
colluding against the third one playing alone). As in Bloch (1995, 1996) and Ray and Vohra
(1999) we assume that the coalition formation game is sequential. Di¤erently from them, we
assume that every rm proposes not only an alliance, but also a division of the coalition joint
payo¤.12 Each recipient of the proposal can either accept or reject the o¤er and, in case of
9A di¤erent strand of literature considers the possible impacts of R&D joint ventures on product market
collusion. See on this, Martin (1995) and Lambertini et al. (2002).
10Pezzino (2010) analyses quantity competition among three rms in a vertically di¤erentiated market.
11These e¤ects resembles the so called peer e¤ect and pecking order e¤ect. The peer e¤ect takes place when
joining organization with high-quality agents increases the payo¤ of its members. This e¤ects explains why
outstanding researchers tend to join top research department. On the other hand, the pecking order e¤ect takes
place when the payo¤ an individual gets depends on his/her relative position in a ranking. Typically, people at
the top in the pecking order have a greater chance to obtain further internal promotions.
12Bloch (1995, 1996) and Ray and Vohra (1999) assume a xed allocation rule within each coalition. See
4
rejection, it becomes its turn to make a proposal. The game is assumed nite-horizon and
every rm only possesses one turn of proposal.13 Once a coalition structure has formed, at
the second stage rms decide simultaneously the optimal quality of their products. When
considering this issue, we take into account how the full or partial collusion among rms may
a¤ect their incentives to di¤erentiate products in the market. Choosing the optimal quality
after colluding, in turn, a¤ects their incentives to collude. Finally, at the third stage, rms set
simultaneously prices. When in an alliance, quality and price are set so as to maximize the
joint prots of rms which belong to it. Notice also that, when colluding, rms can choose
at the second stage (resp. third stage) to produce a quality so low (resp. to quote a price so
high) that no consumer is willing to buy it. This is equivalent to stop producing the variant,
thereby reducing the range of products sold at equilibrium.
We study whether there exist circumstances under which a partial collusion is preferred over
the grand coalition (or noncooperation) and analyse the e¤ects of such intermediate coalition
structures arising at equilibrium in terms of quality, price and prots accruing to the rms.
We nd that the incentive for rms to form a grand coalition is always dominated by
that of colluding in intermediate coalition structures, which in our model emerge as subgame
Nash equilibria of the sequential game of coalition formation. Furthermore, we prove that all
equilibrium coalitions always contains the bottom quality rm which, in all cases, drops its
low-quality variant from the market. In particular, whoever is the additional player included
in coalition (either the intermediate or the top quality rm), equilibrium price and quality
congurations always coincide with that observed in the case of a duopoly, with a high-quality
rm competing against a low-quality rival, as in Motta (1993). At rst sight, this result seems
to be counterintuitive. A natural conjecture when considering that players producing di¤erent
variants collude is that either the range of variants or the quality gap between variants in
the market changes with the players involved in the alliance. We nd on the contrary that
only prots accruing to the single players change with the type of partial collusion, range of
products, quality gap and price being unchanged. Indeed, the cannibalization e¤ect and the
stealing e¤ect induce the coalition, whatever its members, to withdraw from the market the
lowest quality variant between the set which can be produced a priori. Interestingly, depend-
ing on the intensity of these e¤ects, in some circumstances this variant is withdrawn from the
also Belleamme (2000) for an extension of the model to the formation of asymmetric alliances, and also Bloch
(2003, 2004), Marini (2009) and Currarini and Marini (2014) for extensive surveys on alliance formation models
applied to oligopoly.
13Both Blochs (1995, 1996) and Ray and Vohras (1999) models are, instead, innite-horizon.
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market at the price stage, in some other circumstances at the quality stage. In addition, our
results on the stability of intermediate coalition structures are fully in line with many theo-
retical and experimental studies on coalition formation in triads of heterogeneous individuals,
i.e. possessing di¤erent skills or ghting ability (e.g. Caplow 1956, 1959, 1968, Vinacke and
Arko¤ 1957, Gamson 1961). As a matter of facts, a central conclusion of these studies is that
weakness is strength (see, for instance, Mesterton-Gibbons et al. 2011, p.189), with this
meaning that less-powered individuals have usually more chances to be part of a coalition. We
obtain the same result with rms competing in a vertically di¤erentiated market.14
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 briey introduces the paper setting.
Section 3 describes in detail the various equilibrium market congurations, the noncooperative
case,15 the fully collusive case and all di¤erent cases of partial collusion. Section 4 characterize
all equilibria of the alliance formation game. Section 5 briey concludes. Most of the proofs
are gathered in the Appendix.
2 The Model
As mentioned in the introduction, rms are assumed to play a three-stage game: (i) an alliance
formation (sub)game (stage 1) assumed sequential; (ii) a market (sub)game including a quality
stage (stage 2) and a price stage (stage 3). The next section is devoted to introduce the alliance
formation game.
2.1 The Alliance Formation Game
The game of alliance formation occurs at the rst stage of the game, before rms choose
qualities and prices. Following Bloch (1995, 1996) and Ray and Vohra (1999) we model the
process of coalition formation as a sequential unanimity game in which, in a give order, rms
propose to their rivals an alliance to which they belong. The rm with the lowest index among
those receiving the proposal may, in turn, either accept or reject it. In case of acceptance,
the turn passes to the subsequent rm in the proposed alliance and, if all rms accept, the
alliance is irrevocably formed and its members decide cooperatively qualities and prices. If,
alternatively, one of the the rms rejects the o¤er, it becomes its turn to make a proposal and
the game continues with the same logic until a given coalition strucure is obtained. Di¤erently
14Note that in a repeated Cournot game with three heterogeneous rms, Garella and Richelle (1999) obtain
that only one stable cartel exists, always containing the rm with the highest average cost.
15Part of this analysis is also contained in Scarpa (1998).
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from Bloch (1996) and Ray and Vohra (1999) and following Selten (1981) and Chatterjee et
al. (1993) we let the allocation rule be part of the bargaining process.16 Specically, when it
is its turn to o¤er, a rm proposes both an alliance and a division of the alliance prot among
its members. A second distinction of our game with respect to Blochs (1996) and Ray and
Vohras (1999) is that in our case the alliance formation game is a one-shot game in which
every player can make at most one proposal. This means that once one player has proposed an
alliance and has been rejected, he can enter a given alliance only if it is proposed by someone
else, remaining singleton otherwise. For this game, we look for all proles of strategies which
are subgame perfect Nash equilibria.
Formally, our alliance formation game is a triple G =
 
N; fk;kgk2N

, with player set
N = f1; 2; 3g, strategy set k and payo¤ k () :  ! R. For every rm (player) k 2 N ,
a strategy k 2 k denes the actions ak 2 Ak available at any node (or information set
Ik 2 Ik) in which it is its turn to play. In our game, an action for a rm k 2 N can either
be an element of the set fY es;Nog coming in response to another rms proposal pj for j 6= k
or, in turn, a proposal pk = (S;) including an alliance S  N to which k belongs and a
division  2 RjSj of the alliance joint prot S , such that
P
h2S h = S . Thus, for a rm
a strategy k 2 k is a mapping from its information sets to the set of its feasible actions Ak
available therein, namely, f(Ik) : Ik ! Ak, where Ak 

2Nn f?g ;RjSj

[ fYes,Nog

, with
the property that a proposal pk 2

2Nn f?g ;RjSj

can be made by a rm only if, at its turn
of play, there are no other playersproposals on the oor and the rm itself has not already
made a proposal. That is, for every rm k 2 N the action available at every information set Itk
is ak(Itk) = pk if both pj(I
t
j) = ? for j 6= k and pk(fIkg<t) = ? for any previous information
set, and ak(Itk) 2 fYes,Nog otherwise. Note that every strategy prole  = (1; 2; 3) of G
induces an outcome O () = (C () ;()), namely a coalition structure C 2 C and a prole
of payo¤s  = (1;2;3) assigned to the rms in C. The payo¤ of every rm k(p(v)) 2 
is obtained by associating to each coalition structure C a price-quality equilibrium prole p(v)
which will be described in Section 3. As last step, we need to dene a subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium (SPE) of the alliance formation game and, accordingly, a notion of stable coalition
structure.
Denition 1 A subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPE) of the alliance formation game is a
strategy prole  such that, for every rm k 2 N , for every proper subgame G0  G, and for
every k 2 k, k
 
k; 

 k
  k  k;  k.
16The same assumption is also made in Moldovanus (1992).three-player coalition formation game.
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Denition 2 A coalition structure C 2 C (a partition of the N rms) is stable if and only if
it is sustained by a SPE of the alliance formation game, namely, C = C().
2.2 The Market
Let us assume an uncovered market initially populated by three rms, k = 1; 2; 3 selling three
vertically di¤erentiated goods vH ; vM ; vL with vH > vM > vL:17 Also, vi 2 [0; v], where v 2 R+
is the highest quality level which is technologically feasible.18 There exists a quality specic
xed cost, say Ci = 12v
2
i : Consumers are indexed by  and uniformly distributed in the interval
[0; 1] with density 1:19 The parameter  captures consumerswillingness to pay (henceforth
WTP) for quality: the higher ; the higher the corresponding WTP. Each consumer can either
buy one variant or not buying at all. Formally, consumersutility can be written as
U() =
(
vi   pi if he/she buys variant i
0 if he/she refrains from buying.
From the above formulation, the consumer indi¤erent between buying variant i and not
buying is:
i =
pi
vi
;
while the consumer indi¤erent between buying variant i and i+ 1 is:20
i =
pi   pi+1
vi   vi+1 :
Without loss of generality, we can assume that in the noncooperative setting, rm 1 is at the
top, rm 2 at the intermediate level and rm 3 at the bottom of the quality ladder. Thus,
rms 1,2 and 3 produce variant vH ; vM and vL, respectively.
Of course, since qualities are endogenously dened it can happen that under coalition this
apparently innocuous quality assignment no longer holds. For example, one can observe that
the when rm 3 is involved in a collusive agreement, it nds it protable to x its quality in
such a way that it leapfrogs rival 2 in terms of quality. In order to capture this possibility
17Since the market is always endogenously uncovered in the case of full collusion, the assumption of uncovered
market, that some of the consumers refrain from buying goods, appears in our model as the most natural one
(cfr. Section 3.3).
18We share this assumption on the quality interval with Wauthy (1996).
19Considering an interval [0;m] simply leads to the addition of a parameter on which prices, quantities and
quality levels depend linearly, with no substantial changes in the payo¤ structure (see for istance Scarpa 1998).
20We easily deduce the expression of the indi¤erent consumer from: UL() = UM () and UM () = UL()
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without weighting the notation down, we write the demand function for rms k = 1; 2; 3, when
producing vH , vM ; and vL respectively as:
DH = (1  H)
DM = (H   M )
DL = (M   L) :
Then, the corresponding prot functions are:
H =

1  pH   pM
vH   vM

pH   1
2
v2H (1)
M =

pH   pM
vH   vM  
pM   pL
vM   vL

pM   1
2
v2M (2)
L =

pM   pL
vM   vL  
pL
vL

pL   1
2
v2L: (3)
Note that we will add a subscript k to each generic function F and variable f , namely Fk;i and
fk;i, only when the above quality assignment does not hold. For example, if under a collusive
agreement it is rm 3 to produce the intermediate quality variant (instead of rm 2 as in the
noncooperative setting), we use notation D3;M to denote the demand function for rm 3 when
producing the intermediate quality v3;M and 3;M for corresponding prots.
3 Equilibrium Analysis: Prices and Qualities
Since the whole game is solved backward, for the sake of simplicity we can start characterizing
the two nal stages of the game. In particular, we rstly present the case in which rms decide
noncooperatively prices and qualities (non cooperative equilibrium); secondly, we turn to the
case in which the grand coalition decide prices and qualities (full collusion); nally, we look
at what happens when rms form intermediate coalitions (partial collusion). Since prices are
more easily adjusted than qualities, it is reasonable to assume that rms dene qualities at the
second stage (quality choice stage) and x prices at the third one (price stage).
The game is solved by backward induction. So, we consider rst the price stage under the
assumption that qualities have been xed. Then, we move to the quality stage.
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3.1 Noncooperative equilibrium
In this section, we briey summarize price and quantity equilibrium obtained when the three
rms compete in the market against each other, while referring the interesting reader to Scarpa
(1998) for further details. We assume that at the rst stage, no collusive agreement has been
reached so that rms decide their quality and then their price in a fully noncooperative fashion.
3.1.1 Price stage
At the price stage, given that costs are xed, we can study the noncooperative price behaviour
of the three rms by simply characterizing their revenue functions in the quality spectrum: (i)
top quality H, (ii) intermediate quality M and (iii) bottom quality L. Let us assume here,
without loss of generality, that rm 1 has chosen at the quality stage to produce the top quality,
rm 2 the intermediate quality and rm 3 the bottom quality.
Thus di¤erentiating (1), (2) and (3) w.r.t pH; pM; and pL , respectively, we can easily derive
all rmsbest-replies as:
pH(pM ) =
1
2
(pM + (vH   vM )) ; (4)
pM (pH ; pL) =
1
2
(pH(vM   vL) + pL (vH   vM ))
vH   vL (5)
and
pL(pM ) =
1
2
pM
vL
vM
: (6)
As stressed by Scarpa (1996), the best-reply function of a rm depends on the quality and
price of the rm itself and of its neighboring rivals, while products that are farther away in the
product space do not play any role. From the above, equilibrium prices pi at the price stage
are obtained as:
pH(vH ; vM ; vL) =
1
2
(vH   vM ) (4vHvM   vHvL   3vLvM ) 
4vHvM   vHvL   2vLvM   v2M
 (7)
pM (vH ; vM ; vL) =
(vH   vM ) (vM   vL) vM 
4vHvM   vHvL   2vLvM   v2M
 (8)
pL(vH ; vM ; vL) =
1
2
(vH   vM ) (vM   vL) vL 
4vHvM   vHvL   2vLvM   v2M
 ; (9)
with corresponding prots
H(p
(vH ; vM ; vL)) =
1
4
(vH   vM ) (vHvL   4vHvM + 3vLvM )2 
v2M + vHvL   4vHvM + 2vLvM
2   12v2H (10)
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M (p
(vH ; vM ; vL)) = v2M
(vH   vM ) (vM   vL) (vH   vL) 
v2M + vHvL   4vHvM + 2vLvM
2   12v2M (11)
L(p
(vH ; vM ; vL)) =
1
4
vL (vH   vM )2 (vM   vL) vM 
v2M + vHvL   4vHvM + 2vLvM
2   12v2L; (12)
where p = (pH ; p

M ; p

L) denote Nash equilibrium prices of rms obtained at the price stage
(stage 3). Let us now consider the choice of quality levels by rms in the interval [0; v].
3.1.2 Quality stage
In order to characterize the Nash equilibrium quality choices occurring at the second stage, it
su¢ ces to maximize payo¤ function (10), (11) and (12) w.r.t. quality vH ; vM ; vL, respectively,
thereby getting:
vH = 0:2526; v

M = 0:0497; v

L = 0:0095: (13)
Moreover, the corresponding subgame perfect Nash equilibrium prices p(v) and protsi(p(v)),
for v = (vH ; v

M ; v

L), are immediately obtained as:
pH(v
) = 0:106 01; pM (v
) = 0:0091297; pL(v
) = 0:00087255; (14)
H (p

H(v
)) = 0:023489; M (pH(v
)) = 0:0012491; L (pH(v
)) = 0:000053956: (15)
3.2 Collusion
By denition a collusive agreement can either involve the set of all rms, denoted N = f1; 2; 3g
(grand coalition) or, alternatively, any other nonempty subset S  N of them, with S 2 N ,
where N = 2Nn? is the set of all nonempty coalitions of the N rms, in this case simply:
N = (f1g ; f2g ; f3g ; f1; 2g ; f1; 3g ; f2; 3g ; f1; 2; 3g) :
Thus, while if the rms form the grand coalition they commit irrevocably to jointly set qualities
and prices so as to maximize the sum of all rmsprots (full cooperation), in the second
scenario (partial collusion), a smaller subset of rms jointly decide qualities and prices, again
irrevocably, so as to maximize the sum of their own prots, while competing against a rival(s),
if any. In general, we can describe any type of (full or partial) rm collusion or noncooperative
behaviour by simply indicating the coalition structure C = (S1; S2; :::; Sm) representing a
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collection of rms in alliances having null intersection and summing up to N , with m  n.
The set C of all coalition structures C that can be formed by the three rms is, therefore,
simply given by:
C = ((f1g ; f2g ; f3g) ; (f1; 2g ; f3g) ; (f1g ; f2; 3g) ; (f1; 3g ; f2g) ; (f1; 2; 3g)) :
The game is solved backward so that we rst analyse the price and then the quality stage
under the assumption that either the grand coalition or any other intermediate coalition struc-
ture have formed at the rst stage. After the full characterization of market equilibrium in
any of these cases, we wonder which type of collusion (if any) will prevail in equilibrium.
3.3 Full Collusion
Let us assume that, at the rst stage, the rms have formed the grand coalition. In the
following, we consider the price and then the quality decision.
3.3.1 Price stage
When the grand coalition fNg forms, at the price stage each rm maximizes the sum of all
rmspayo¤s (1)-(3) for arbitrary levels of the quality chosen at the second stage. Without loss
of generality, henceforth we can keep the quality assignment that at the quality stage rm 1 has
chosen to produce the top quality, rm 2 the intermediate quality and rm 3 the bottom quality
product, by symmetry with the assumption made in the noncooperative scenario. Thus, by the
price maximization of the joint payo¤ of the grand coalition, the rm fully-collusive optimal
replies pcL; p
c
M and p
c
H are obtained as
pcH(pM ) = pM +
1
2
(vH   vM ); (16)
pcM (pH ; pL) =
pH(vM   vL) + pL (vH   vM )
vH   vL ; (17)
and
pcL(pM ) = pM
vL
vM
: (18)
By solving the system (16)-(18), an fully collusive optimal prices prole pfNg(v), for v =
(vH ; vM ; vL), is obtained as:
p
fNg
H (vH) =
1
2vH ; p
fNg
M (vM ) =
1
2vH ; p
fNg
L (vL) =
1
2vL: (19)
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Given the above prices, the market share of any rm at the price stage, turns out to be:
DH
 
pfNg(v)

= 12 ; DM
 
pfNg(v)

= 0; DL
 
pfNg(v)

= 0: (20)
It is immediate to see that, at the prices selected by the grand coalition, consumers are
willing to buy only the top quality variant vH , the demand for the intermediate and bottom
variants being nil. Accordingly, the prot accruing to the grand coalition at the price stage
are
fNg(pfNg (v)) =
1
4
vH   1
2
v2H :
3.3.2 Quality stage
In order to fully characterize the behaviour of the grand coalition, we can easily nd its optimal
quality, given by vfNgH = 0:25, so that prot obtains as:
fNg

pfNg(vfNg)

= 0:03125: (21)
The logic underlying this nding has been well described by Mussa and Rosen (1978):
Serving customers who place smaller valuations on quality creates negative externalities for
the monopolist that limit possibilities for capturing consumer surplus from those who do value
quality highly. (p.306).21 Rather interestingly, this nding does not depend on the initial
assumption on the market coverage. Indeed, even if one would develop the above analysis under
the alternative assumption that the market is covered, still at the price-quality equilibrium the
grand coalition would o¤er only the top-quality, while serving half of the market.
Finally, it is worth remarking that, under a full collusive behaviour, the level of prices
is, for all rms, always higher than under Nash equilibrium. This can be easily checked by
the following simple reasoning: (i) Start with the Nash equilibrium price of rm 1 and let the
remaining rms responding using their optimal collusive replies (16)-(17). (ii) Since comparing
(4)-(5) with (16)-(17) it turns out that optimal cooperative replies are twice as sloped as the
noncooperative best-replies and both upward sloping, as e¤ect of (i) all Nn f1g rms will
21Further discussion on this result are provided by Gabszewicz et al. (1982) and by Gabszewicz and Wauthy
(2002) under the assumption of zero quality costs. Along the same research line, Acharia (1998) shows that
when the cost for quality improvement is not too convex, a multiproduct monopolist o¤ers only the top variant
among the ones which a priori can be sold in the market. Indeed, if the costs are not so signicant, o¤ering
the top variant only allows rms to escape from the cannibalization e¤ect which would take place if the more
than one variant would be saled at equilirium. Finally, Lambertini (1997) analyses the Mussa-Rosens model
with quality specic variable costs under the alternative assumption of full market coverage and partial market
coverage.
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increase their prices. (iii) Let now also rm 1 respond cooperatively using its cooperative
optimal reply (18) and, as a result, it will increase its price. (iv) By continuing the adjustment
process of all rms along their collusive optimal replies, since these are all contractions (due
to inequality vH > vM > vL), a new price prole pfNg will be reached with the property that
pfNg  p, where p is the corresponding prole of noncooperative Nash equilibrium prices.
3.4 Partial collusion
In this section we analyse all market congurations arising when partial collusion takes place
among rms. We characterize three di¤erent market scenarios occurring, in turn, under the
following coalition structures: (i) C1;23 = (f1g ; f2; 3g), (ii) C13;2 = (f1; 3g ; f2g) and, nally
(iii) C12;3 = (f1; 2g ; f3g). Without loss of generality, we can start the analysis by assuming
that, rms 1, 2 and 3 produce the high, intermediate and low quality variants, respectively.
This assumption is in line with the quality assignment in the noncooperative setting. We then
verify whether at the second stage of the game such an assignment remains optimal for rms
in partial collusive agreements or if, conversely, a quality reversal can take place.
Before describing in detail the price and quality behaviour of rms under partial collusion,
note that from (1)-(3) when either the bottom quality rm or the top quality rm collude
in prices with their direct competitor, i.e. the intermediate quality rm, they just behave
as in the fully collusive case, with optimal replies given by (16) and (18), respectively. On
the other hand, when bottom and quality rms form a coalition, due to the structure of
the vertical di¤erentiation model, they set prices exactly as in the noncooperative case, with
optimal replies given by (4) and (6). Thus, under partial collusion only the price behaviour
of the rm producing the intermediate quality variant vM (henceforth denoted intermediate
rm) varies according on whether it is allied either with its left (lower quality) or with its right
(higher quality) competitor. In particular, when the intermediate rm colludes with its left
competitor, its rst-order condition implies
@M
@pM
+
@L
@pM
=
2pL   2pM
vM   vL +
pH   2pM
vH   vM = 0;
whereas, when it colludes with its right-competitor, it sets pM such that
@M
@pM
+
@H
@pM
=
pL   2pM
vM   vL +
2pH   2pM
vH   vM = 0:
As a result, the optimal reply of the intermediate rm, plcM (pL; pH) in the left-partial (resp.
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prcM (pL; pH) in the right-partial) collusion writes as
plcM (pL; pH) =
pL(vH   vM ) + 12pH(vM   vL)
(vH   vL) (22)
(resp. prcM (pL; pH) =
1
2pL(vH   vM ) + pH(vM   vL)
(vH   vL) ). (23)
3.4.1 Collusion between intermediate and bottom quality rms
We consider initially the scenario where at the rst stage a collusive agreement has been reached
by rm 2 and rm 3, with rm 1 playing as singleton against them. We assume, as a start,
that variants vM and vL are produced by the colluding rms 2 and 3, respectively. Firm 1,
outside the collusive agreement, produces the high quality variant vH : This assumption is in
line with the quality assignment holding in the noncooperative scenario. We can check later if
this quality assignment is optimal at the equilibrium.
Price stage As coalition structure C1;23 = (f1g ; f2; 3g) forms, prices pH ; pM and pL set at
the last stage by rms 1, 2 and 3 are found from the maximization of the following objective
functions
1;H =

1  pH   pM
vH   vM

pH
2;M +3;L =

pH   pM
vH   vM  
pM   pL
vM   vL

pM +

pM   pL
vM   vL  
pL
vL

pL:
Using (4), (18), and (22), the optimal replies are obtained, respectively, as
ppcH (pM ) =
1
2
(pM + (vH   vM ))
ppcM (pH ; pH) =
pL(vH   vM ) + 12pH(vM   vL)
(vH   vL)
ppcL (pM ) =
vL
vM
pM :
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Therefore, the following equilibrium prices are set by rms:
p
(f1g;f2;3g)
H (v) =
2vH (vH   vM )
4vH   vM ;
p
(f1g;f2;3g)
M (v) =
vM (vH   vM )
4vH   vM ;
p
(f1g;f2;3g)
L (v) =
vL (vH   vM )
4vH   vM ;
where v = (vH ; vM ; vL), with corresponding prots:
H(p
(f1g;f2;3g)(v)) = 4
v2H (vH   vM )
(4vH   vM )2
  1
2
v2H ;
M (p
(f1g;f2;3g)(v)) =
vH (vH   vM ) vM
(4vH   vM )2
  1
2
v2M ;
L(p
(f1g;f2;3g)(v)) = 0:
Note that in this case the price of the low quality variant is set so high that no consumer
is willing to buy this variant and, therefore, Df2;3gL = 0. Thus, rm 3 ceases to be active in
the market: selling the bottom-quality variant would determine a cannibalization e¤ect only
within the coalition since the variant vL would be in competition with the adjacent product
vM . Of course, it still plays a role in the coalition as the decision to stop producing benets
the coalition as a whole.22
Quality stage Then, moving to the quality stage and using the best reply functions, it is
immediate to show that the top variant and the intermediate variant are respectively
v
(f1g;f2;3g)
H = 0:253 31; v
(f1g;f2;3g)
M = 0:04823 8: (24)
Given the above values, we can easily nd the equilibrium prices as
p
(f1g;f2;3g)
H = 0:107 66; p
(f1g;f2;3g)
M = 0:010251; (25)
with corresponding equilibrium prots:

(f1g;f2;3g)
1 = 
(f1g;f2;3g)
H = 0:024439;

(f1g;f2;3g)
2 +
(f1g;f2;3g)
3 = 
(f1g;f2;3g)
M = 0:0015274:
(26)
22 Its role will be claried at the alliance formation stage.
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We observe that at equilibrium, rm 1 produces the top quality while the coalition f2; 3g
sells the intermediate quality and our assumption on the quality assignment is satised. Note
also that the above ndings coincide with those emerging in Motta (1993) where only two rms
compete in a traditional duopoly setting. Indeed, coalition f2; 3g behaves like a multiproduct
rm: since it withdraws from the market one of its variant, it is as if two single-product rms
would be active in the market, each of them setting in a noncooperative way their quality and
price. We resume these results in the next proposition.
Proposition 1 When rms 2 and 3 collude against rm 1 (playing as singleton), namely
under coalition structure C1;23 = (f1g ; f2; 3g), at the price stage colluding rms set a price so
high for the low quality variant that no consumer is willing to buy it. Thus, at the two-stage
partial collusive equilibrium only two variants are marketed and the equilibrium conguration
in terms of quality and price coincides with that occurring in a traditional duopoly setting where
only two rms compete.
Proof. It directly follows by expressions (24) and (25) and by their comparison with results
obtained, for instance, in Motta (1993).
Finally, it is worth remarking that this collusion benets both the colluding rms and the
rival 1 which plays as a singleton. Indeed, not only the lowest quality variant is dropped out
from the market, but also the gap between the variants in the market is larger than the one
emerging in the non cooperative setting with three independent rms: under partial collusion,
the optimal quality of the intermediate variant is lower while the top quality is higher than
the corresponding ones in the noncooperative setting. This relaxes price competition between
rms thereby increasing the resulting prots.
3.4.2 Collusion between top and bottom quality rms
Let us move now to the case where the agreement at the rst stage has been reached by rms 1
and 3, with rm 2 playing as singleton. Let us remind that, in line with the quality assignment
made in the noncooperative scenario, we start assuming that at the second stage rms 1 and 3
have decided to produce variant vH and vL, respectively. Firm 2 sells the intermediate variant
vM . As usual, we will verify later whether this quality assignment holds at the SPNE.
Price stage To obtain the optimal prices set by the colluding rms 1 and 3 and by the rm
2 alone we need to take into account the fact that colluding rms 1 and 3 maximize the sum
of their prots H +L, while 2 is only concerned with its own prot function M . However,
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since rm 1 and 3 are not close neighbours and are separated by rm 2, at the price stage their
equilibrium prices coincides with those obtained in the noncooperative case:
p
(f1;3g;f2g)
H (vH ; vM ; vL) =
1
2
(vHvL   4vHvM + 3vLvM ) (vH   vM ) 
vHvL   4vHvM + 2vLvM + v2M

p
(f1;3g;f2g)
M (vH ; vM ; vL) =
(vL   vM ) (vH   vM ) vM 
vHvL   4vHvM + 2vLvM + v2M

p
(f1;3g;f2g)
L (vH ; vM ; vL) =
1
2
(vL   vM ) (vH   vM ) vL 
vHvL   4vHvM + 2vLvM + v2M

and prots are:

(f1;3g;f2g)
H (vH ; vM ; vL) =
1
4
(vH   vM ) (vHvL   4vHvM + 3vLvM )2 
vHvL   4vHvM + 2vLvM + v2M
2   12v2H

(f1;3g;f2g)
M (vH ; vM ; vL) =
v2M (vH   vL) (vM   vL) (vH   vM ) 
vHvL   4vHvM + 2vLvM + v2M
2   12v2M

(f1;3g;f2g)
L (vH ; vM ; vL) =
1
4
vM (vM   vL) (vM   vH)2 vL 
vHvL   4vHvM + 2vLvM + v2M
2   12v2L:
Quality stage We can now move to the quality stage. In order to identify the optimal
qualities, notice that the revenue of coalition f1; 3g is monotonically decreasing in vL, as
@


(f1;3g;f2g)
H +
(f1;3g;f2g)
L

@vL
=
1
4
v2M
(vH   vM )2
 
v2M + vHvL + 20vHvM   22vLvM
 
v2M + vHvL   4vHvM + 2vLvM
3 < 0
Accordingly, at the quality stage the colluding rms 1 and 3 will nd it protable to set
vL = 0, whatever the quality chosen by the rival 2: The economic intuition underlying this
nding is that the low quality variant and the intermediate variant are strategic complements.
So, if the colluding rms would increase vL; the independent rm producing vM would increase
the quality of its own variant, thereby making tighter the competition with the high quality
producer.23 Since the prot loss for rm L deriving from decreasing the low quality level is
lower than the gain obtained by the high quality rm H when competition between vM and
vH relaxes, then the colluding rms will optimally set vL = 0 and restrict their production
choice to the high quality variant vH :
23See also Scarpa (1998), pg 669 for the same e¤ect in a three-rm noncooperative setting.
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As a result, from the rst-order conditions obtained maximizing, in turn, the prot of
coalition f1; 3g w.r.t to vH and the prot of rival 2 w.r.t vM , namely
@ (1;H +3;L)
@vH
=
 
vHv
3
M   64v4H + 48v3HvM + 16v3H   12v2Hv2M + 8vHv2M   12v2HvM

(4vH   vM )3
= 0
@2;M
@vM
=
 
v4M   12vHv3M   64v3HvM + 4v3H + 48v2Hv2M   7v2HvM

(4vH   vM )3
= 0
given that we know that, at equilibrium v(f1;3g;f2g)L = 0, we obtain the equilibrium optimal
qualities set under coalition structure C13;2 = (f1; 3g ; f2g):
v
(f1;3g;f2g)
H = 0:25331; v
(f1;3g;f2g)
M = 0:048238: (27)
It immediately follows that, equilibrium prices are:
p
(f1;3g;f2g)
H = 0:10766; p
(f1;3g;f2g)
M = 0:010251; (28)
with corresponding equilibrium prots:

(f1;3g;f2g)
H = 0:024439; 
(f1;3g;f2g)
L = 0; 
(f1;3g;f2g)
M = 0:0015274: (29)
Again, the assumption that rms variants vH ; vM and vL are associated to rms 1,2 and 3, re-
spectively, is satised and the partial agreement between rm 1 and 3 can be fully characterized
in the next proposition.
Proposition 2 When rms 1 and 3 collude against rm 2 that competes as singleton, namely
under coalition structure C13;2 = (f1; 3g ; f2g), at the quality stage the low quality variant is
set equal to zero. Prices and qualities o¤ered in equilibrium coincide with those observed under
C23;1 = (f2; 3g ; f1g) :
Proof. It directly follows by comparing expressions (24) and (25) with (27) and (28).
It is worth noting that from a market structure viewpoint, the formation of coalition struc-
tures C23;1 and C13;2 are equivalent, as both of them entail a duopoly structure with the same
quality gap between variants. Still, the rationale underlying the equilibrium conguration in
coalition C23;1 cannot be extended to C13;2. In the former case, namely when the rms 2 and
3 compete against the top quality rm 1, the colluding rms decide at the price stage to x
a very high price for the bottom variant so that no consumer is willing to buy it, whatever
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its quality. So, this nding would be observed even if rms would be prevented from dening
endogenously the quality of their product. In this case, no ambiguous e¤ect can be attributed
to the low quality variant vL. It is adjacent only to variant vM . So, if it would be kept in the
market, it would reap consumers to the other colluding player without playing any role in the
competition against the top quality rm. Rather, in the latter scenario rms 1 and 3 decide
to reduce the bottom quality to such an extent that the corresponding market share for this
variant turns out to be nil. Of course, as this strategy is put in place at the quality stage, if
qualities would be exogenously given, this nding would no longer be observed and all variants
would be sold at equilibrium. When the coalition decides to withdraw variant vL from the
market, it takes into account two di¤erent e¤ects. On one hand, since the low quality variant
is adjacent to the intermediate variant, ceteris paribus, increasing its quality can enable the
coalition to gain market share from the competitor 2 producing variant vM and thus to benet
from higher prots for the bottom quality rm. On other hand, as these two variants vM and
vL are strategic complements, the higher the quality of the bottom variant, the higher the
optimal quality of the intermediate variant. This latter variant is in turn in direct competition
with the top variant: since the lower the quality gap, the ercer the price competition between
players, the higher the intermediate quality, the lower, ceteris paribus, prots accruing to the
top quality player. The loss for this player when the low quality is produced is higher than the
gain obtained by the bottom producer so that the coalition stops producing the variant.
3.4.3 Collusion between top and intermediate quality rms
Finally, we characterize the equilibrium conguration when at the rst stage of the game rm
1 and rm 2 decide to collude, with the bottom quality rival (here rm 3) playing as singleton.
As usual, we assume that rms 1,2 and 3 produces variants vH ,vM and vL, respectively. Then,
we check whether this assumption is satised at the quality stage. We consider rst the price
stage, qualities being taken at this stage as exogenous.
Price stage At the price stage, rms 1 and 2 maximize the sum of their own prots, namely
H + M , whereas rm 3 is playing independently. Using (6), (16) and (23), the optimal
replies under coalition structure C12;3 = (f1; 2g ; f3g) are obtained, respectively, as
20
ppcH (pM ) = pM +
1
2
(vH   vM )
ppcM (pL; pH) =
1
2pL(vH   vM ) + pH(vM   vL)
(vH   vL)
ppcL (pM ) =
1
2
vL
vM
pM .
Thus, equilibrium prices are easily found as:
p
(f1;2g;f3g)
H (vH ; vM ; vL) =
(4vHvM   vHvL   3vLvM )
2 (4vM   vL) ;
p
(f1;2g;f3g)
M (vH ; vM ; vL) =
2vM (vM   vL)
4vM   vL ;
p
(f1;2g;f3g)
L (vH ; vM ; vL) =
vL (vM   vL)
4vM   vL :
The corresponding rmsprots are:

(f1;2g;f3g)
H =
1
4
(4vHvM   vHvL   3vLvM )
(4vM   vL)  
1
2
v2H ;

(f1;2g;f3g)
M =
vLvM (vM   vL)
(4vM   vL)2
  1
2
v2M ;

(f1;2g;f3g)
L =
vLvM (vM   vL)
(4vM   vL)2
  1
2
v2L.
Quality stage We saw before that at the price stage, when the coalition structure C12;3 =
(f1; 2g ; f3g) formed, no variant is withdrawn from the market. Still, at the quality stage, it
can be proved that a case of quality reversal occurs. This is done in the next proposition.
Proposition 3 In order to escape from the cannibalization e¤ect taking place between adjacent
variants, the colluding rms 1 and 2 enhance maximal di¤erentiation between their products
by setting the intermediate quality at the bottom of the quality ladder. The rival 3 leapfrogs
rm 2, thereby producing a variant which lies now in the middle of the quality ladder.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Notice that now, prot f1;2g3;M coincides with that obtained by rm 2 when producing variant
vM in coalition f2; 3g, namely f2;3g2;M : Thus, it follows that coalition f1; 2g produces top and
bottom qualities against rm 3 producing instead the intermediate quality variant. So, due to
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the leapfrogging by rm 3, the variants produced by the colluding rms 1 and 2 coincide now
with those produced under the coalition structure C1;23 = (f1g ; f2; 3g) where rms 2 and 3
were the ones to collude. Moreover, in C12;3 = (f1; 2g ; f3g) the independent rm 3 produces
now the variant that in the the previous scenarios was sold by rm 2. In line with the analysis
performed in the previous case, the optimal variants are immediately obtained here as:
v
(f1;2g;f3g)
1;H = 0:253; v
(f1;2g;f3g)
2;L = 0 v
(f1;2g;f3g)
3;M = 0:04824; (30)
while the equilibrium prots write as:

(f1;2g;f3g)
1;H +
(f1;2g;f3g)
2;L = 0:024439;

(f1;2g;f3g)
3;M = 0:0015274:
(31)
Thus, one can state the following proposition.
Proposition 4 When rm 1 and rm 2 collude against rm 3 which colludes as singleton,
namely under coalition structure C12;3 = (f1; 2g ; f3g), at the quality stage rm 3 leapfrogs
the adjacent rival 2 whose variant is no longer on sale in the market. The optimal qualities
coincide with those occurring under the alternative coalition structures C13;2 = (f1; 3g ; f2g)
and C1;23 = (f1g ; f2; 3g).
Proof. This follows directly by Proposition 3 and by comparing (27), (24) and(30).
For ease of exposition, we summarize in the following table the payo¤s accruing to each
rm or coalition in each feasible coalition structure.
(f1g ; f2g ; f3g) 1;H = 0:023489 2;M = 0:0012491 3;L = 0:000053956
fNg fNg123;H = 0:03125
(f1g ; f2; 3g) ((1);(23))1;H = 0:024439 ((1);(23))23;M = 0:0015274
(f1; 3g ; f2g) (f1;3gf2g)13;H = 0:02443 9 (f1;3gf2g)2;M = 0:0015274
(f1; 2g ; f3g) (f1;2g;f3g)12;H = 0:02443 9 (f1;2g;f3g)3;M = 0:0015274
Table 1 - Firm payo¤s in every coalition structure.
It is worth remarking that the market structure (duopoly) arising under partial collusion
does not vary with the coalition structure induced by the rms. Still, the prots accruing to
rms depend on the coalitions to (against) which they belong (compete).
22
4 Equilibrium Analysis: Alliance Structures
4.1 The protability and cooperative stability of the grand coalition
A rst glance at the Table 1 shows that, in terms of rmspayo¤, the grand coalition is by far
the most protable coalition structure in the vertical di¤erentiated market. Before starting to
analyse the stability of coalition structures in the sequential game, we may wonder whether the
grand coalition is stable against coalitional deviations in a classical sense, namely whether there
are feasible allocation of the monopoly prot that are in the core of the associated transferable
utility game. In particular, we can easily associate to the vertical di¤erentiated market a
partition function game  = (N; v (S;C(S))), where N is the set of rms and v(S;C(S)) 2 R is
the worth associated to every coalition of rms S  N embedded in a given coalition structure
C 2 C whose S is part. In our model, when an alliance S  N forms, its maximal payo¤
obtains when the remaining rms stick together in the complementary coalition fNnSg.24
Therefore, if the core of the partition function game  exists when every S  N is embedded
in C = (S;NnS), it will a fortiori exist in any other coalition structure containing S. Let us
state this result more formally.
Denition 3 The core of the partition function game (N; v (S;C)) consists of all e¢ cient
prot allocations  2 RjN j+ such that
P
k2S i  v (S;C(S)) for all S  N and for all C(S) in
which S can be embedded.
Thus, we can prove the following result.
Proposition 5 In the three-rm vertically di¤erentiated market with endogenous qualities and
prices, the core of the partition function game  = (N; v (S;C)) is nonempty.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The above result simply says that in a vertical di¤erentiated market with three rms
competing in prices, there would be room for cooperative agreements between rms. However,
as we show in the next section, when the bargaining process is sequential and the rms possess
24 In a triopoly, the behaviour of rms outside a coalition S matters only when each individual rm k is com-
peting with remaining rms in Nn fkg, that, in turn, can either play together, or stay as singletons. Moreover,
from Section 3 we know that when two rms form a coalition they eliminate one of the variant either at the
quality or at the price stage. Therefore, a rm playing as singleton prefers that its competitiors merge rather
than compete independently in the market: in game-theoretic terms there exist positive coalition externalities
(see, for instance, Yi, 1997 and 2003).
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a nite set of possibilities to propose coalitions and divisions of the joint prot to their rivals,
the grand coalition can never be enforced in equilibrium. In particular, we show that only
intermediate coalition structures can be enforced as subgame perfect equilibrium of the alliance
formation game.
4.2 Stable Alliances Structures
In this section we characterize the equilibria of the sequential game of alliance formation. Since
this game is sensitive to the identity of the initial player, we consider, in turn, the outcomes
obtained when either rm 1, 2 and 3 starts the bargaining process. Let us rst consider the
case in which the rm producing the top-quality good (rm 1) is the initiator of the coalition
formation game.
It can be proved the following:
Proposition 6 When rm 1 is the initiator of the sequential alliance formation game, the
only stable coalition structure is C1;23 = (f1g ; f2; 3g).
Proof. See the Appendix.
In the next proposition, applying the same rationale as above, we can easily show that,
when rm 2 is the initial player, C13;2 = (f1; 3g ; f2g) is the only stable coalition structure.
Proposition 7 When rm 2 is the initiator of the sequential alliance formation game, the
only stable coalition structure is C13;2 = (f1; 3g ; f2g).
Proof. See the Appendix.
Notice that, in both above cases the initiator of the game is never part of an alliance at the
equilibrium. Indeed, as shown in detail in the proofs of Proposition 6 and 7, the payo¤ for a
rm to remain singleton (and rationally expecting that the other rms will prefer to collude)
dominates that of being part of the grand coalition, since in this case the distribution of prots
will be unfavourable for the initial proposer. The equilibrium prot accruing to either rm 1
or 2 when initiating the game and competing against an alliance is, therefore, larger than when
they are part of the alliance itself. The optimal strategy is, therefore, to induce the remaining
rms to collude.
A di¤erent result arises when rm 3 (the bottom quality one) begins the negotiation process.
The reason is that, in this case, rm 3 cannot credibly commit to remain independent when
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the remaining rms (1 and 2) prefer to play as singletons rather than forming an alliance (see
Table 1). This is due to the fact that the alliance between rm 1 and 2 optimally leapfrogs the
bottom quality rm, and ends up sharing the top quality rm duopoly payo¤, which is lower
than the sum of their prots under triopoly (cf. section 3.4.3). Under these circumstances,
rm 3 will prefer to let rm 1 to play independently, and it will form an alliance with rm 2.
This is shown in the next proposition.
Proposition 8 When rm 3 is the initiator of the sequential alliance formation game, the
only stable coalition structure is C1;23 = (f1g ; f2; 3g).
Proof. See the Appendix.
It is worth noting that if the game initiator would be selected at random, the most likely
outcome of the alliance formation game would certainly be that in which the coalition structure
C1;23 = (f1g ; f2; 3g) forms, the other possible outcome implying the formation of C13;2 =
(f1; 3g ; f2g). Moreover, although at equilibrium the same coalition structure C1;23 forms both
when either rm 1 or 3 starts the negotiation, there is a di¤erence in term of rent extraction,
in the two cases, for colluding rms 2 and 3: when rm 1 is the one starting the negotiation,
rm 2 in alliance f2; 3g only receives its outside option 2 = 2;M = 0:0012491, whereas rm
3 is able to get a prot 3 = 
(f1g;f2;3g)
2M  2;M = 0:0002783 > 3;L, exploiting its last-mover
advantage in the sequential game. When, on the other hand, it is rm 3 to start the game, rm
2 in alliance f2; 3g receives (f1g;f2;3g)2M   3;L = 0:0014734 > 2;M = 0:0012491, while rm 3
only receives its noncooperative payo¤ 3;L = 0:000053956. In both cases, rm 1 receives its
duopoly payo¤ 1 = 0:024439.
Surprisingly, in the alliance formation game, overall rm 2 enjoys a rst-mover advantage,
since when it starts the negotiation, it is able to enforce C13;2 = (f1; 3g ; f2g) and extract a
prot 2 = 
(f1;3gf2g)
2;M = 0:0015274 higher than in all other cases. Moreover, this comes at
expense of rm 1, which in coalition structure C13;2 only receives its noncooperative payo¤
1;H = 0:023489.
Finally, it can be noticed that, since for any order of play our one-shot coalition formation
game always sustains only one equilibrium alliance structure, the nite repeated version of
game will generate similar outcomes. We condense these conclusions in the next corollary.
Corollary 1 If the alliance formation game is repeated for a nite number of periods, the
coalition structures which are stable under the one-shot game would continue to be so, sustained
by the same SPE strategy prole repeated at each period.
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Therefore, even in a repeated nite-horizon framework, our results on intermediate coalition
structures would continue to hold.
5 Concluding Remarks
We have investigated the endogenous formation of alliances in a vertically di¤erentiated market
in which full or partial binding agreements among rms can be signed over prices and qualities
of the products. We show that regardless of the high protability of the full collusive agreement
(i.e. the one signed by all rms in the market), such an arrangement can never be obtained in a
(nite horizon) sequential negotiation process requiring the unanimity of rms. Conversely, we
nd that the sequential bargaining process enforces only partial collusive agreements, namely
those involving subsets of rms. In particular, stable associations of rms always include the
rm producing the bottom quality variant, which is, however, never sold by the coalition at
equilibrium. Further, whatever the coalition structure arising at the equilibrium, the market
moves from a triopoly to a duopoly with only two variants on sale. The rationale underlying
this apparently surprising result can be found in the nature of competition among vertically
di¤erentiated rms. Indeed, under an intermediate coalition structure, the optimal set of
products to market is dened by balancing the cannibalization e¤ect within the coalition and
the stealing e¤ect occurring between the coalition and the rm outside. When the bottom
quality is kept for sale in the market under a collusive agreement, the former e¤ect always
dominates the latter. As immediate consequence, this variant is withdrawn from the market
and the equilibrium conguration coincides with that observed in the case of a duopoly in terms
of price and quality gap between variants (Motta, 1993). In a complementary perspective, we
can state that moving from a triopoly (observed in the noncooperative scenario) to a duopoly
under partial collusion, rms can soften price competition in the market and magnify the
quality di¤erentiation between the variants kept on sale. Interestingly, this view is in line with
the empirical ndings of Sweeting (2010) in radio music industry. He nds that rms that buy
competing stations tend to emphasize "service di¤erentiation" among themselves and also from
the competing stations. Partial collusion is thus a means to enhance dynamic competition for
the market, while decreasing static competition in the market.
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6 Appendix: Omitted Proofs
A.1 Proof of Proposition 3
Proposition 3. In order to escape from the cannibalization e¤ect taking place between ad-
jacent variants, the colluding rms 1 and 2 enhance maximal di¤erentiation between their
products so that the intermediate quality is set at bottom of the quality ladder. The rival 3
leapfrogs rm 2, thereby producing a variant which lies now in the middle of the quality ladder.
Proof. At the quality stage, rmsprots are:

f1;2g
H =
1
4
(4vHvM   vHvL   3vLvM )
(4vM   vL)  
1
2
v2H

f1;2g
M =
vLvM (vM   vL)
(4vM   vL)2
  1
2
v2M

f1;2g
L =
vLvM (vM   vL)
(4vM   vL)2
  1
2
v2L

f1;2g
H + 
f1;2g
M =
vHv
2
L+16vHv
2
M 8vLv2M v2LvM+16vLv3M 32v4M 2v2Hv2L 32v2Hv2M 2v2Lv2M+16v2HvLvM 8vHvLvM
4(vL 4vM )2
It is easy to see that, the coalitions prot f1;2gH + 
f1;2g
M is monotonically decreasing in vM ,as
@

1
4
(4vHvM vHvL 3vLvM )
(4vM vL)
+
vLvM (vM vL)
(4vM vL)2
  1
2
(v2H+v
2
M )

@vM
 (4v
3
LvM+v
3
L 48v2Lv2M+20v2LvM+192vLv3M 256v4M)
4(vL 4vM )3 < 0
So, the colluding rms nd it protable to set the quality of the intermediate variant at the
minimum admissible value, say 0: By doing this, they choose to produce a variant which is at
the bottom of the quality ladder. If the competitor 3 would keep his own variant at the same
quality level; then he would obtain nil prots. Rather, choosing to produce an intermediate
variant v3;M > 0 would yield positive equilibrium prots equal to

f1;2g
3;M =
v2M (vH   vL) (vM   vL) (vH   vM ) 
v2M + vHvL   4vHvM + 2vLvM
2 > 0 :
As this prot f1;2g3;M is strictly positive for any vH > vM > vL = 0; one can conclude that rm
3 nds it protable to leapfrog the rival 2.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 5
Proposition 5. In the three-rm vertically di¤erentiated market with endogenous qualities
and prices, the core of the partition function game  = (N; v (S;C)) is nonempty.
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Proof. Core allocations are individually-rational and group-rational prot division  =
(1;2;3) of the e¢ cient monopoly payo¤ v(N) = 
fNg
123;H = 0:03125. Thus, the set of  2
Core() must respect the following inequalities:
3P
k=1
k = v(N) = 
fNg
123;H = 0:03125;
1 +2  v (f1; 2g ; (f1; 2g ; f3g)) = (f1;2g;f3g)12;H = 0:024439
1 +3  v (f1; 3g ; (f1; 3g ; f2g)) = (f1;3gf2g)13;H = 0:024439
2 +3  v (f2; 3g ; (f1g ; f2; 3g)) = ((1);(23))23;M = 0:0015274
1  v (f1g ; (f1g ; f2; 3g)) = ((1);(23))1;H = 0:024439
2  v (f2g ; (f1; 3g ; f2g)) = (f1;3gf2g)2;M = 0:0015274
3  v (f3g ; (f1; 2g ; f3g)) = (f1;2g;f3g)3;M = 0:0015274
which surely hold, since:
0:024439 + 0:0015274 + 0:0015274 = 0:027494 < 0:03125:
Note also that for every rm v (fkg ; (fkg ; fNn fkgg)) > v (fkg ; (fkg ; fjg ; fhg)) for any j; h 2
Nn fkg and then the above inequality ensure also the individual stability when after a rm
leaves the grand coalition, the coalition of remaining rms split-up in singletons. Thus all
e¢ cient payo¤ allocations  = (1;2;3) rewarding every rm at least its maximal deviating
payo¤ and redistributing the remaining surplus Z among the three rms, namely
Z = 
fNg
123;H  ((1);(23))1;H  (f1;3gf2g)2;M  (f1;2g;f3g)3;M = 0:008500 6
belong to the core, which is, therefore, nonempty.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 6
Proposition 6. When rm 1 is the initiator of the sequential coalition formation game, the
only stable coalition structure is C1;23 = (f1g ; f2; 3g).
Proof. The game can be solved backward. Firms 1 available actions at the initial node
(information set I11 2 I1) are the following (proposals):
A1(I
1
1 ) = [(fNg ;) ; (f1; 2g ;) ; (f1; 3g ;) ; (f1g)] :
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Assume rst that rm 1 proposes the grand coalition fNg associated to a given division of the
e¢ cient monopoly prot  2 fNg between the three rms. By the order of the game, rm
2 can either accept or reject. If it rejects the o¤er, it is its turn to make a proposal and can
propose one of the following:
A2(I
1
2 ) = [(fNg ;) ; (f1; 2g ;) ; (f2; 3g ;) ; (f2g)] :
We know (by Table 2) that, for any associated payo¤ division, the coalition structure C12;3 =
(f1; 2g ; f3g) is dominated by the choice of rm 1 and 2 to play as singletons, since

(f1;2g;f3g)
12;H < 

1;H +

2;M
and, therefore, when made, proposal p122 = (f1; 2g ;) will always be rejected by rm 1. In this
event, rm 1 has no more proposals to make. Thus, rm 3 can gain its highest payo¤by propos-
ing fNg, o¤ering the noncooperative prots to 1 and 2 and get the di¤erence fNg123;H  1;H  
2;M , which is its most protable outcome. To break the ties, we can initially assume that,
when gaining equal payo¤s the rms prefer to be in coalition rather than being as singletons
(but the reasoning can be repeated when the case opposite holds). A similar outcome would be
reached if, after a rejection, rm 2 proposes p232 = (f2; 3g ;) or pN2 = (fNg ;), which would
be both refused by rm 3, willing to propose (as last proposer) the grand coalition, obtaining:
3 = 
fNg
123;H 1;H 2;M . Analogously, if rm 2 accepts the grand coalition proposed by rm
1, it knows that, in its turn to play, rm 3 will always reject such proposal and propose, in turn,
the grand coalition with a payo¤ allocation assigning to its rivals their Nash equilibrium pay-
o¤s. Thus, reasoning backward, rm 1 knows that, if it proposes the grand coalition, it would
get at most its Nash equilibrium payo¤. For this reason it can try to make alternative o¤ers.
Proposing p1 = (f1; 2g ;) is out of question, since player 2 would always reject it, and the
game would return to the situation described above. Another chance for player 1 is to proposes
p131 = ff1; 3g ;g that, in turn, rm 3 would reject with the aim to propose again ff1; 3g ;g,
o¤ering to rm 1 its noncooperative outside option. Alternative proposals by rm 3 (after its
rejection of f1; 3g proposed by rm 1) involving rm 2, as pN3 = ffNg ;g or p233 = ff2; 3g ;g
would be rejected by rm 2 to enforce, as last proposer, the grand coalition payo¤. As a result,
at the initial node the most protable action for rm 1 is to propose p11 = f1g, signalling its
intention to play irrevocably as singleton. Doing this, it knows that when it is its turn to play,
rm 2 can propose either p232 = ff2; 3g ;g or p2 = f2g. In the rst case, rm 2 knows that
rm 3 will prefer to reject its proposal in order to propose itself p233 = ff2; 3g ;g o¤ering
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2;M to rm 2 and keeping the di¤erence, since: 
(f1gf2;3g)
23  2;M > 3;L. In the second case,
namely if rm 2 proposes p22 = f2g, a triopoly will form and rm 2 will receive 2;M . Since
with equal payo¤s rms prefer by assumption to be in coalition rather than being as single-
tons, in this subgame its choice will be p232 = ff2; 3g ;g. Therefore, the coalition structure
C1;23 = (f1g ; f2; 3g) is stable because is sustained by the following SNE strategy prole along
the equilibrium path:25
 =

1 = f1g ; 2 =

f2; 3g ;0

; 3 =

No, f2; 3g ;00

;
where 0 = (02;03), for 02 = 
(f1g;f2;3g)
23   3;L, 03 = 3;L; and 
00
=


00
2 ;
00
3

, for

00
2 = 

2;M and 
00
3 = 
(f1gf2;3g)
23   2;M . When we assume, to break the ties, that with
equal payo¤s rms prefer to be singletons rather than being in coalition, the same coalition
structure C1;23 can be enforced by a SPE of the coalition formation game with the di¤erence
that, along the equilibrium path, 02 = 
(f1gf2;3g)
23  

3;L + 

, 03 = 3;L +  and 
00
2 =
2;M + , 
00
3 = 
(f1gf2;3g)
23  

2;M + 

, for  > 0. The same occurs in all other proposals
with presence of coalitions. The reason is that to convince a rm to join a coalition it must
receive something more (an  > 0) than its noncooperative payo¤. Therefore, the coalition
structure C1;23 remains stable (namely sustained by a SPE strategy prole of the sequential
coalition formation game) whatever the rule adopted to break ties. Finally, to see that C1;23
is the only stable coalition structure arising when rm 1 is the initiator of the game, note
that any alternative strategy prole cannot be SPE just because rm 1 would always possess
an incentive to protably deviate proposing p1 = f1g with the expectation to compete in a
duopoly (namely under C1;23) with a payo¤ 
((1);(23))
1;H = 0:024439 rather than remaining with
its triopoly prot 1;H = 0:023489 (or in turn, 

1;H + ).
A.4 Proof of Proposition 7
Proposition 7. When rm 2 is the initiator of the sequential coalition formation game, the
only stable coalition structure is C13;2 = (f1; 3g ; f2g).
Proof. As before the game can be solved backward. Firm 2 available actions at the initial
node (information set I12 2 I2) are:
A2(I
1
2 ) = [(fNg ;) ; (f1; 2g ;) ; (f2; 3g ;) ; (f2g)] :
25We have verbally described the out of equilibrium path actions which compose the SPE strategy prole 
and, therefore, for ease of simplicity, we do not repeat it here.
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As before, if rm 2 proposes the grand coalition fNg associated to a given division of the
monopoly prot  2 fNg, the next player, rm 1, rejects the o¤er to o¤er, in turn, one of
the following:
A1(I
1
1 ) = [(fNg ;) ; (f1; 2g ;) ; (f1; 3g ;) ; (f1g)] :
Again, we know that coalition structure C12;3 = (f1; 2g ; f3g) is dominated by the choice
of rm 1 and 2 to play as singletons and, therefore, proposal p121 = (f1; 2g ;) will always
be rejected by rm 2. If this occurs, rm 2 has no more proposals to make and, hence,
rm 3 can propose fNg, obtaining 3 = fNg123;H   1;H   2;M , which is its most protable
outcome. Similar outcome would be reached if, after a rejection, rm 1 proposes, in turn,
p131 = (f1; 3g ;) or pN1 = (fNg ;), which could be either refused or accepted by rm 2,
but in any case the nal payo¤ would be, for rm 1 and 2, their noncooperative outside
options. Thus, reasoning backward, rm 2 knows that by proposing the grand coalition, it will
receive at most its noncooperative payo¤. Its alternative proposals are p122 = (f1; 2g ;) which
would always be rejected by rm 1, and the game would reach the same outcome described
above, and p232 = ff2; 3g ;g that, in turn, rm 3 would reject with the aim to propose itself
p3 = ff2; 3g ;g, o¤ering to rm 2 its noncooperative outside option. which is better than
propose any other coalition containing rm 1, that would exploit its last mover advantage.
Note that forming f2; 3g is, for rm 3, better than any other proposal involving rm 1, that
could exploit in this case its last-mover advantage. Thus, at the initial node the most protable
action for rm 2 is to propose p22 = f2g, knowing (by assumption) that rm 1 will prefer to be
in coalition rather than being as singleton, proposing p131 = ff1; 3g ;g rather than p11 = f1g.
Hence, the proposal p131 will be rejected by rm 3, which will propose, in turn, p
13
3 = ff1; 3g ;g
o¤ering 1;H to rm 1 and keeping the di¤erence for it, since 
(f1;3gf2g)
13   1;H > 3;L. As
a result, the coalition structure C13;2 = (f1; 3g ; f2g) is stable because is sustained by the
following SNE strategy prole along the equilibrium path:26
 =

1 =

f1; 3g ;0

; 2 = f2g ; 3 =

No, f1; 3g ;00

;
with 0 = (01;03), where 01 = 
(f1;3gf2g)
13   3;L and 03 = 3;L and 
00
=


00
2 ;
00
3

, where

00
1 = 

1;H and 
00
3 = 
(f1;3gf2g)
13   1;H . As in the proof of Proposition 6, when under equal
payo¤s, rms prefer to be singletons rather than being in coalition, coalition structure C13;2
can be enforced as a SPE of the coalition formation game for, 01 = 
(f1;3g;f2g)
13  

3;L + 

26Again, for simplicity, we skip the description of all playersout of equilibrium actions.
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and 03 = 3;L+ , 
00
1 = 

1;H +  and 
00
3 = 
(f1;3g;f2g)
13  

1;H + 

, for  > 0; and, similarly
for all other proposal involving coalitions outside the equilibrium path. Finally, C13;2 is the
only stable coalition structure when rm 2 is the initiator just because in any alternative
strategy prole rm 2 will always prefer to propose p22 = f2g and compete in a duopoly with
a payo¤ (f1;3gf2g)2;M = 0:0015274 rather than have its triopoly prot 

2;M = 0:0012491 (or in
turn, 2;H + ), which occur in all other subgames.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 8
Proposition 8. When rm 3 is the initiator of the sequential coalition formation game, the
only stable coalition structure is C23;1 = (f2; 3g ; f1g).
Proof. Again in this proof we reason backward. Note that when rm 3 is the initiator
of the game, the line of reasoning is slightly di¤erent than in the other two cases described in
Proposition 6 and 7. Firm 3 available actions at the initial node (information set I13 2 I3) are:
A3(I
1
3 ) = [(fNg ;) ; (f1; 3g ;) ; (f2; 3g ;) ; (f3g)] :
To break ties assume initially that, with equal payo¤s, rms prefer to be in coalition rather than
being as singletons. We rst note that if rm 3 proposes p33 = f3g, the turn passes to player
1, who can either propose p11 = f1g, in which case the game ends with C1;2;3 = (f1g ; f2g ; f3g)
or instead p121 = (f1; 2g ;), which again forces the game to end with C1;2;3 = (f1g ; f2g ; f3g),
since C1;23 = (f1g ; f2; 3g) is dominated by C1;2;3 for both rm 1 and 2 (see Table 1). So
di¤erently from above, rm 3 is unable to enforce the formation of its complementary coalition
Nn f3g = f1; 2g by signalling its willingness to play as singleton. Alternatively, when rm 3
proposes either pN3 = (fNg ;) or p133 = (f1; 3g ;) it always induces the formation of coalition
structure C1;23 with 1 = 
(f1g;f2;3g)
1H , 2 = 
(f1g;f2;3g)
2M   3L and 3 = 3L. The reason is
that, by the order of the play, after both these proposals, the turn passes to rm 1 and the
optimal strategy for rm 1 is to reject the proposal and announce p11 = f1g, thus inducing
proposal p232 = (f2; 3g ; ()) by rm 2 with 2 = (f1g;f2;3g)2M  3L and 3 = 3L, that rm 3
will accept. Finally, if rm 3 proposes at the beginning of the game p233 = (f2; 3g ;), for any
 rm 2 would reject it it to propose, in turn, p232 = (f2; 3g ;), again o¤ering 3 = 3L to
rm 3, which would be obliged to accept. Therefore, since by assumption with equal payo¤s
rms prefer to be in coalition, the game possesses as unique outcome the intermediate coalition
structure C1;23 = (f1g ; f2; 3g), which can be sustained as a SPE strategy proles. Again, it
can be easily seen that the game outcome does not change if, to break ties, we assume that
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under equal payo¤s rms prefer to play as singletons rather than in coalitions.
REFERENCES
Accharya, R. (1998). "Monopoly and Product Quality: Separating or Pooling Menu?", Eco-
nomics Letters, 61, 187194.
Belleamme, P., (2000). "Stable Coalition Structures with Open Membership and Asymmetric
Firms", Games and Economic Behavior, 30, 1-21.
Bloch, F. (1995). "Endogenous Structures of Associations in Oligopolies", Rand Journal of
Economics, 26, 537-556.
Bloch, F. (1996). "Sequential Formation of Coalitions with Fixed Payo¤ Division", Games
and Economic Behaviour, 14, 90-123.
Bloch, F. (2002). "Coalition and Networks in Industrial Organization", The Manchester
School, 70, 36-55.
Bloch, F. (2003). "Coalition Formation in Games with Spillovers" in: Carraro C. (eds.) The
endogenous formation of economic coalitions, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Series on Eco-
nomics and the Environment, Cheltenham, U.K. and Northampton, Mass., Elgar.
Caplow, T. (1956). "A Theory of Coalitions in the Triad", American Sociological Review, 21,
489-493.
Caplow, T. (1959). "A Theory of Coalitions in the Triad", American Sociological Review, 64,
488-493.
Caplow, T. (1968). Two Against One: Coalitions in Triads, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cli¤,
NJ.
Chatterjee K. B., B. Dutta, D. Ray, K. Sengupta (1993). "A Noncooperative Theory of
Coalitional Bargaining", Review of Economic Studies, 60, 463-477.
Currarini, S., M. A., Marini, (2014) "Coalitional Approaches to Collusive Agreements in
Oligopoly Games", The Manchester School, forthcoming.
Ecchia, G. and L. Lambertini (1997). "Minimum Quality Standards and Collusion," Journal
of Industrial Economics, 45, 1, 101-13.
Gabszewicz, J. J., A. Shaked, J. Sutton, J-F. Thisse, (1986). "Segmenting the Market: the
Monopolists Optimal Product Mix" Journal of Economic Theory, 39, 2, 273-289.
Gabszewicz, J. J., X. Y.,Wauthy (2002). "Quality Underprovision by a Monopolist when
Quality is not Costly" Economics Letters, 77, 1, 65-72.
33
Gamson, W. A. (1961). "A Theory of Coalitions in the Triad", American Sociological Review,
21, 489-493.
Garella, P. G. and Y. Richelle (1999). "Exit, Sunk Costs and the Selection of Firms", Economic
Theory, 13, 643-670.
George, L. (2007). "Whats t to print: the e¤ect of ownership concentration on product
variety in daily newspapers markets", Information Economics and Policy, 19, 285-303.
Giraud-Heraud, E., H. Hammoudi, M. Mokrane, (2003), "Multiproduct Firm Behaviour in a
Di¤erentiated Market", Canadian Journal of Economics, 36, 1, 41-61.
Hackner, J. (1994). "Collusive pricing in markets for vertically di¤erentiated products," Inter-
national Journal of Industrial Organization, 12, 2, 155-177.
Lambertini, L. (2000). "Technology and Cartel Stability under Vertical Di¤erentiation", Ger-
man Economic Review, 1, 4, 421-444.
Lambertini, L., S. Poddar and D. Sasakic (2002). "Research joint ventures, product di¤eren-
tiation, and price collusion", International Journal of Industrial Organization 20, 829854.
Johnson, J. P. and D., Myatt (2003), "Multiproduct Quality Competition: Fighting Brands
and Product Line Pruning", American Economic Review, 93, 3, 748-774.
Marini, M. A. (2009) "Games of Coalition & Network Formation: a Survey", in Naizmada A.K.
et al. (eds.). Networks, Topology and Dynamics. Lectures Notes in Economics & Mathematical
Systems, 613, 67-93, Berlin Heidelberg, Springer-Verlag.
Martin, S., (1995). "R&D Joint ventures and tacit product market collusion", European Jour-
nal of Political Economy, 11, 733741.
Mesterton-Gibbons, M., , S. Gavriletz, G. Janko, E. Akcay, (2011), "Models of Coalition or
Alliance Formation", Journal of Theretical Biology, 274, 187-204.
Mc Millan, M., (2012). "Quality collusion: news, if it aint broke, why x it?", Fordham
Urban Law Journal, 39, 5, 1895-1942.
Motta, M., (1992). "Cooperative R&D and vertical product di¤erentiation", International
Journal of Industrial Organization 10, 643661.
Moldovanu, B. (1992). "Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibrium and the Core in Three-Player
Games", Games and Economic Behavior, 9, 21-34.
Mussa, M. and S. Rosen (1978). "Monopoly and product quality", Journal of Economic
Theory, 18, 301317.
Pezzino, M. (2010). "Minimum Quality Standards with More Than Two Firms Under Cournot
Competition.", The IUP Journal of Managerial Economics, 8, 3, 26-45.
Ray, D. and R. Vohra (1999). "A Theory of Endogenous Coalition Structures", Games and
34
Economic Behavior, 26, 2, 286-336.
Rubinstein, Ariel (1982). "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model". Econometrica, 50, 1,
97109.
Scarpa, C. (1998). "Minimum quality standards with more than two rms," International
Journal of Industrial Organization, 16, 5, 665-676.
Selten, R. (1981). "A Non-cooperative Model of Characteristic Function Bargaining", in Essays
in game Theory and Mathematical Economics in honor of O. Morgenstern. (V. Bohm and H.
Nachcamp, Eds.). Mannheim: Bibliographisches Institute.
Steven T. B., J.Waldfogel, (2001). "Do Mergers Increase Product Variety? Evidence from
Radio Broadcasting", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116, 3, 1009-1025.
Sweeting, A. (2010). "The e¤ects of mergers on product positioning: evidence from the music
radio industry", Rand Journal of Economics, 41(2), 372-397.
Vinacke, V. E. and A. Arko¤ (1957). "An Experimental Study of Coalitions in the Triad",
American Sociological Review, 22, 406-414.
Wauthy, X. (1996). "Quality Choice in Models of Vertical Di¤erentiation", Journal of Indus-
trial Economics, 44, 3, 345-53.
Yanich, D. (2013), "Local TV News, Content, and the Bottom Line", Journal of Urban A¤airs,
35, 3, 327342.
Yanich, D. (2010), "Does Ownership Matter? Localism, Content, and the Federal Communi-
cations Commission", Journal of Media Economics, 23, 5167.
Yanich, D. (2011), "Local TV News & Service Agreements: A Critical Look", Report, Center
for Community Research & Service School of Public Policy & Administration, University of
Delaware.
Yi, S.-S. (1997). "Stable Coalition Structure with Externalities", Games and Economic Be-
haviour, 20: 201-237.
Yi, S. S., (2003). "The Endogenous Formation of Economic Coalitions: The Partition Func-
tion Approach" in C. Carraro (ed.) The endogenous formation of economic coalitions, Fon-
dazione Eni Enrico Mattei Series on Economics and the Environment, Cheltenham, U.K. and
Northampton, Mass.: Elgar.
35
Recent titles 
CORE Discussion Papers 
 
2014/65 Jean HINDRIKS and Yukihiro NISHIMURA. On the timing of tax and investment in fiscal 
competition models.  
2014/66 Jean HINDRIKS and Guillaume LAMY. Back to school, back to segregation? 
2014/67 François MANIQUET et Dirk NEUMANN. Echelles d'équivalence du temps de travail: 
évaluation de l'impôt sur le revenu en Belgique à la lumière de l'éthique de la responsabilité. 
2015/01 Yurii NESTEROV and Vladimir SHIKHMAN. Algorithm of Price Adjustment for Market 
Equilibrium. 
2015/02 Claude d’ASPREMONT and Rodolphe DOS SANTOS FERREIRA. Oligopolistic vs. 
monopolistic competition: Do intersectoral effects matter? 
2015/03 Yuuri NESTEROV. Complexity bounds for primal-dual methods minimizing the model of 
objective function. 
2015/04 Hassène AISSI, A. Ridha MAHJOUB, S. Thomas MCCORMICK and Maurice QUEYRANNE. 
Strongly polynomial bounds for multiobjective and parametric global minimum cuts in graphs 
and hypergraphs. 
2015/05 Marc FLEURBAEY and François MANIQUET. Optimal taxation theory and principles of 
fairness. 
2015/06 Arnaud VANDAELE, Nicolas GILLIS, François GLINEUR and Daniel TUYTTENS. 
Heuristics for exact nonnegative matrix factorization. 
2015/07 Luc BAUWENS, Jean-François CARPANTIER and Arnaud DUFAYS. Autoregressive moving 
average infinite hidden Markov-switching models. 
2015/08 Koen DECANCQ, Marc FLEURBAEY and François MANIQUET. Multidimensional poverty 
measurement with individual preferences 
2015/09 Eric BALANDRAUD, Maurice QUEYRANNE, and Fabio TARDELLA. Largest minimally 
inversion-complete and pair-complete sets of permutations. 
2015/10 Maurice QUEYRANNE and Fabio TARDELLA. Carathéodory, helly and radon numbers for 
sublattice convexities. 
2015/11 Takatoshi TABUSHI, Jacques-François THISSE and Xiwei ZHU. Does technological progress 
affect the location of economic activity. 
2015/12 Mathieu PARENTI, Philip USHCHEV, Jacques-François THISSE. Toward a theory of 
monopolistic competition. 
2015/13 A.B. TAYLOR, J.M. HENDRICKX and F. GLINEUR. Smooth strongly convex interpolation 
and exact worst-case performance of first-order methods. 
2015/14 Christian HAFNER, Hans MANNER and Léopold SIMAR. The “wrong skewness” problem in 
stochastic frontier models: A new approach. 
2015/15 Paul BELLEFLAMME, Nesssrine OMRANI Martin PEITZ. The Economics of Crowdfunding 
Platforms. 
2015/16 Samuel FEREY and Pierre DEHEZ. Multiple Causation, Apportionment and the Shapley Value. 
2015/17 Mehdi MADANI and Mathieu VAN VYVE. A MIP Framework for Non-convex Uniform Price 
Day-ahead Electricity Auctions. 
2015/18 Yukihiro NISHIMURA and Pierre PESTIEAU. Efficient Taxation with Differential Risks of 
Dependence and Mortality. 
2015/19 Louis N. CHRISTOFIDES, Michael HOY, Joniada MILLA and Thanasis STENGOS. Nature or 
Nurture in Higher Education? Inter-generational Implications of the Vietnam-Era Lottery. 
 
Recent titles 
CORE Discussion Papers – continued 
 
2015/20 Philippe J. DESCHAMPS, Alternative Formulations of the Leverage Effect in a Stochatic 
Volatility Model with Asymmetric Heavy-Tailed Errors. 
2015/21 Jean HINDRIKS and Yukihiro NISHIMURA. Equilibrium Leadership in Tax Competition 
Models with Capital Ownership: A Rejoinder. 
2015/22 Frédéric VRINS and Monique JEANBLANC. The Φ-Martingale. 
2015/23 Wing Man Wynne LAM. Attack-Dettering and Damage Control Investments in Cybersecurity. 
2015/24 Wing Man Wynne LAM. Switching Costs in Two-sided Markets. 
2015/25 Philippe DE DONDER, Marie-Louise LEROUX. The political choice of social long term care 
transfers when family gives time and money. 
2015/26 Pierre PESTIEAU and Gregory PONTHIERE. Long-Term Care and Births Timing. 
2015/27 Pierre PESTIEAU and Gregory PONTHIERE. Longevitiy Variaations and the Welfare State. 
2015/28 Mattéo GODIN and Jean HINDRIKS. A Review of Critical Issues on Tax Design and Tax 
Administration in a Global Economy and Developing Countries 
2015/29 Michel MOUCHART, Guillaume WUNSCH and Federica RUSSO. The issue of control in 
multivariate systems, A contribution of structural modelling. 
2015/30 Jean J. GABSZEWICZ, Marco A. MARINI and Ornella TAROLA. Alliance Formation in a 
Vertically Differentiated Market. 
 
 
Books 
 
W. GAERTNER and E. SCHOKKAERT (2012), Empirical Social Choice. Cambridge University Press. 
L. BAUWENS, Ch. HAFNER and S. LAURENT (2012), Handbook of Volatility Models and their 
Applications. Wiley. 
J-C. PRAGER and J. THISSE (2012), Economic Geography and the Unequal Development of Regions. 
Routledge. 
M. FLEURBAEY and F. MANIQUET (2012), Equality of Opportunity: The Economics of Responsibility. 
World Scientific. 
J. HINDRIKS (2012), Gestion publique. De Boeck. 
M. FUJITA and J.F. THISSE (2013), Economics of Agglomeration: Cities, Industrial Location, and 
Globalization. (2nd edition). Cambridge University Press. 
J. HINDRIKS and G.D. MYLES (2013). Intermediate Public Economics. (2nd edition). MIT Press. 
J. HINDRIKS, G.D. MYLES and N. HASHIMZADE (2013). Solutions Manual to Accompany Intermediate 
Public Economics. (2nd edition). MIT Press. 
J. HINDRIKS (2015). Quel avenir pour nos pensions ? Les grands défis de la réforme des pensions. De 
Boeck. 
 
 
CORE Lecture Series 
 
R. AMIR (2002), Supermodularity and Complementarity in Economics. 
R. WEISMANTEL (2006), Lectures on Mixed Nonlinear Programming. 
A. SHAPIRO (2010), Stochastic Programming: Modeling and Theory. 
